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1 Introduction
Bringing the new right to data portability (RTDP) from
an abstract legal provision in Article 20 of the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016 into
practice requires a greater role for the IT design commu-
nity. Simply put, the RTDP seeks to empower users by
giving them greater control over their personal data, en-
abling them to both acquire their data and then move it
around, for example to a different data controller. In this
paper, we focus on how IT designers can use Privacy by
Design (PbD) approaches to respond to these RTDP ob-
ligations. We are particularly interested in how the RTDP
plays out for the technological context of the domestic
Internet of things (IoT). By examining the legal, com-
mercial and technical landscape around the RTDP, we
can begin to unpack the practical roadblocks and oppor-
tunities ahead in implementing the right in practice.
Legally, IT designers are increasingly being called
upon to engage with regulatory compliance through
Article 25 of the GDPR. This provision establishes the
legal obligation to do information privacy1 by design
and default for personal data-driven technologies. PbD
mandates creation of safeguards to satisfy the requirements of
the entire GDPR and protect data subject rights.2 This requires
IT designers to build appropriate technical or organisational
safeguards into the system, taking into account the state of the
art, cost of implementation, and nature, scope and purpose of
processing.
We are particularly interested in the domestic IoT domain,
where personal information is collected by physical sensors and
actuators installed in socially complex, traditionally private set-
tings [12]. Many IoT services maintain an ongoing relationship
with users where their personal data is mined and analysed with
the goal of providing value-added, contextually appropriate, ser-
vices—for example automating routine tasks like room heating
management. Readings from motion, temperature or CO2 sen-
sors can be combined to make inferences, develop behavioural
profiles and make predictions about users. There are privacy
implications around how such IoT-derived personal data is
pieced together to create models of room and building
occupancy.
IoT devices often dictate how users can interact with their
personal data. Seemingly mundane design decisions around sup-
ported interactions and how a system handles data (e.g. cloud or
local storage) can limit control and transparency around the per-
sonal data flows. This can impact user comprehension about how
their data are being used (e.g. for profiling, targeted behavioural
advertising, law enforcement investigations), and accordingly
2 Art 25 (1) GDPR BTaking into account the state of the art, the cost of
implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as
well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of
natural persons posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at the time of
the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing
itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as
pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection princi-
ples, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the
necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of
this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.^
1 We use terminology of ‘information privacy’ instead of ‘data protection’ in
this paper.
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impacts their agency to exercise their legal rights (e.g. how to do
subject access requests or withdraw consent). Greater attention
needs to be paid to how these IoT systems are designed and their
associated data-driven business models to foster trust in these
new technologies.
Data is utilised by many stakeholders in the IoT data supply
chain, often legitimised by the legal fiction of informed consent
through service terms and conditions. The scope for IoT privacy
harms often stem from risks around data flowing beyond appro-
priate contexts, without adequate user oversight. Legally, the lack
of scope users have to control data flows after it is collected is a
concern for ethical and sustainable growth of the emerging IoT
market. A key motivation of the RTDP is redressing the domi-
nant model of centralising data from different sources for subse-
quent analytics.
In this paper, we challenge the current zeitgeist that
monetisation of data, with its incumbent legal obligations, is
the best businessmodel formany personal domestic IoTsystems.
However, in response, through a PbD approach, novel technical
platforms and architectures, like personal information manage-
ment systems (PIMS), we also offer new directions. PIMS sup-
port realisation of legal rights by giving users greater control over
their personal data. More broadly, they provide a route to
rebalancing power asymmetries between users and service pro-
viders, by disrupting emergent commercial practices of IoT
services.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the
RTDP, its legal nature, what it requires from IT designers whilst
reflecting limitations, particularly in relation to domestic IoT. In
Sect. 3, we consider regulatory challenges from the emerging
domestic IoT sector and situate our arguments within the wider
legal mandate of RTDP as part of doing information PbD for the
IoT. In Sect. 4, we focus on technical approaches to support
realisation of RTDP, namely PIMS. The state of the art in data
management architectures, tools and platforms that can provide
portability, increased transparency and user control over data
flows are analysed. In Part IV, we bring our perspectives together
to reflect on the numerous technical, legal and business barriers
and opportunities that will shape implementation of the right in
practice, and how the relationship may shape future IoT innova-
tion and business models. We finish with brief conclusions about
the ongoing relationship between RTDP and PbD for the IoT.
2 Legal perspective
2.1 Introducing the right to data portability (RTDP)
Fundamentally, Article 20 of the GDPR provides data subjects
the RTDP to increase control over their personal data,3 but
before unpacking the legal nature of how it does this, further
background on the GDPR and key terminology is necessary.
The long-debated GDPR passed into law in 2016 and will be
enforced from May 2018, when it replaces the current, ‘pre-
Internet’ Data Protection Directive 1995 (DPD). GDPR
reframes and subtly updates principles, rights and responsibil-
ities from the existing DPD but also adds several new provi-
sions, like RTDP. To help navigate DP terminology, Table 1
(in Appendix) provides short and full versions of key legal
terms: data subject, personal data, data processing, data con-
troller and data processor.
Returning to the RTDP, conceptually it is two constituent
rights, namely a ‘right to receive’ and a ‘right to transmit’ data
[7:4–5]. With the former, data subjects have a right to obtain
their data from a data controller in a structured, commonly
used, interoperable4 and machine-readable format.5 With the
latter, data subjects have a right to move data between data
controllers without hindrance, or where technically feasible,
have data moved directly between data controllers.6
The RTDP only applies to data ‘concerning’ the data sub-
ject and data they ‘provided to’ the data controller,7 and we
consider each in turn.
1. ‘Concerning’—Firstly, this excludes anonymised data
when it does not concern the data subject, but pseudony-
mous data that can be linked to the subject does count
[7:10]. An issue around ‘data concerning the data subject’
is when it relates to third parties who may not have
consented to data processing (e.g. a visitor to a property
captured on a smart CCTV system). The Article 29
Working Party8 (A29 WP) Opinion on Data Portability
(revised in Spring 2017) [7] argue the term should be
interpreted loosely, hence telephone, messaging or VoIP
call records showing third-party phone numbers could
still be ‘concerning’ the data subject and thus given to
them under a portability request.
When the new data is subsequently given to a new data
controller, they should not process it in ways that adversely
affect the rights and freedoms of third parties, e.g. for direct
marketing of products and services [7:11]. Importantly, a legal
basis is still necessary for processing the third-party data, as
consent is likely lacking. The A29 WP argues that the legiti-
mate interests’ grounds, discussed further below, can be
claimed by the new data controller. This applies when they
are enabling the data subject to use their personal data (includ-
ing the third-party data) solely for ‘purely personal or
3 Recital 68 GDPR
4 BData controllers should be encouraged to develop interoperable formats that
enable data portability.^ (Recital 68)
5 Article 20 (1) GDPR; Recital 68
6 Article 20(2) GDPR; ‘right to transmit’; this does not extend to controllers
providing technically compatible processing IT infrastructure.
7 Article 20(1) GDPR
8 An EU data protection regulation advisory body
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household activities’. This could include users gaining greater
insight into their data by analysing their energy consumption
or financial data, as initiatives like the UK government led
‘midata’ seek to do. The A29 WP suggests controllers should
provide ‘tools’ for data subjects to select the data they are
interested in and then exclude third-party data [7:12]. How
these measures manifest in practice for IoT will pose HCI
issues in creating intuitive tools that can visualise IoT data in
a comprehensible format, with adequate granularity.
2. ‘Provided by the data subject’—Again turning to A29WP
clarity, they argue that this includes two categories of data.
Firstly, it is ‘data actively and knowingly provided by the
data subject’ like e-mail addresses, user names, passwords
input into a service. Secondly, there is ‘observed data that
are provided by virtue of the use of the service or the
device’ like location and traffic data, smart meter data,
heart rate data and search history[7:10]. Accordingly,
‘provided by’ needs to be interpreted widely, but it is
not unlimited, and data that has been ‘inferred’ or ‘de-
rived’ through further analysis performed by a service
provider is excluded. This includes statistical or algorith-
mic insights for personalisation services, profiling or user
categorisations [7:11]. For IoT, this could limit what data
individuals can request from service providers, for exam-
ple, tracking of home occupant movements detected by a
Nest learning thermostat interactions could be okay, but
not the algorithmically derived heating schedule. We re-
turn to this discussion later.
Lastly, the RTDP only relates to personal data processed by
automated means (i.e. by a computer, not paper records),
where the lawful basis for doing so is either:
– The data subject has given consent, or explicit consent
(for special categories of personal data), or
– Where processing is necessary to fulfil performance of a
contract the data subject is party to, or at their request,
prior to entering a contract.9
In addition to only relating to data based on contracts or
consent, RTDP should be applied ‘without prejudice’ to other
rights, like the right to erasure10 but not to ‘processing neces-
sary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller’ or when it will ‘adversely affect the rights and
freedoms of others’.11 These involve complex legal balancing
exercises, such as determining what is in the public interest,
and what constitutes adverse effects.
To delve a bit further into the contractual and consent-
based nature, with contractual necessity, this includes personal
data processed as part of performance of a contract with the
data subject like ‘the titles of books purchased by an individ-
ual from an online bookstore, or the songs listened to via a
music streaming services’ [7:5]. For example, in the context of
domestic IoT, pressing an Amazon Dash as entering a contract
to buy and a record being kept of what is purchased and when.
With consent, showing a data subject has given consent
could become harder, especially for IoT. This is because the
new framing in GDPR raises the bar above the current DPD.
Consent should be freely given, specific, informed and an
unambiguous indication of the individual’s wishes.12 It should
be provable through a record of the consent and how it was
given, individuals have a right of withdrawal, and where con-
sent is part of a bigger contract, transparency should be in-
creased by flagging what is being consented to and by writing
clearly in plain language.13 For ‘special categories of personal
data’ (e.g. race or ethnic origin, sex life or orientation, political
beliefs, health data, genetic or biometric data), explicit consent
is necessary, but what this requires above and beyond normal
consent is not clear in the law.14 In any case, an act of affir-
mation is critical, whereas silence, inactivity or pre-ticked
boxes are not enough.15 The inadequacies of consent are well
known, due to shortcomings of terms and conditions being the
dominant mechanism [79]. These GDPR conditions establish
a high threshold to be met for legal consent, and IoT busi-
nesses need to work to meet these as many IoT devices pro-
cess both normal and sensitive data. This ranges from health
data directly obtained from wearables like heart rate trackers
or political opinions from users speaking to Amazon Alexa.
Indirectly, humidity sensors in smart heat alarms may indicate
sex life, and smart entry systems with fingerprint recognition
gather biometric data.
Ensuring appropriate consent mechanisms are in place with
IoT is a design challenge, one that is elevated when consent
rules are read in conjunction with GDPR stipulations on9 Art 20 (1)(a) GDPR ‘the processing is based on consent pursuant to point (a)
of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2) or on a contract pursuant to point (b)
of Article 6(1); and the processing is carried out by automated means’.; Art
6(1) (a) and (b) GDPR state—‘Processing shall be lawful only if and to the
extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given
consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific
purposes or (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data
subject prior to entering into a contract’; Art 9(2)(a) GDPR states ‘the data
subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for
one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law
provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the
data subject’.
10 Article 20(3) GDPR
11 Art 20(3) and 20(4) GDPR
12 Article 9(1) GDPR
13 Article 7, GDPR
14 Article 9 (1)
15 Recital 32 GDPR
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framing of information and communications between data
controllers and subjects.16 Any communication about rights,
like RTDP, is to be ‘concise, transparent, intelligible and easily
accessible form, using clear and plain language’17 in writing,
electronically or even orally (when requested). Wider infor-
mation provision requirements in GDPR18 mandate control-
lers provide extensive information to subjects, like controller
identity and contact details, any intended third country data
transfer, and period data will be stored (to name but a few).
The heterogeneity of IoT device interfaces (or indeed com-
plete lack of) pose complications for delivery of adequate
information and obtaining GDPR-compliant explicit consent.
Utilising IoT device affordances to create new interactions
through delivery methods like videos, audio and feedback
from gestures like hand-waving or blinking lights and sounds
may redefine consent mechanisms and shift away from the
dominance of form contract terms and conditions.
Whilst this discussion of consent goes beyond RTDP di-
rectly, we include it to show that despite this paper focusing on
the realising data portability, in practice compliance will not
be siloed and separated out to just one right at a time. Instead,
the RTDP sits not in isolation, but within a wider, complex
framework, the GDPR, which mandates a vast range of com-
pliance obligations. These vary greatly from not transferring
data outside of the EU to countries with inadequate protection,
doing data protection impact assessments, only collecting
minimal data and storing for a limited time, ensuring secure
and transparent processing and many more. Hence,
responding to the RTDP goes beyond technical requirements
of making systems interoperable or creating application pro-
gramming interfaces (APIs) so data can be ported. Instead, it
raises more fundamental questions about how devices and
ecosystems are designed to ensure GDPR compliance, where
RTDP is one cog in a big wheel. Thinking about the ongoing
relationship with data controllers and how information can be
communicated to end users about their rights is key. A more
engaged approach with regulatory compliance during design
of systems and services could foster real changes in how per-
sonal data is handled and how privacy of users is protected.
2.2 Wider relationship of RTDP and IoT
GDPR provisions on PbD follow the global trend of regulators
towards using technology design in regulation, as seen in
Canada [14], the USA [33] and Australia [69]. In Europe,
the RTDP and PbD are intrinsically linked, as PbD is required
to meet the GDPR requirements and protection of rights, one
of which is RTDP. This requires establishment of safeguards
like organisational policies, creation of certification processes
and adoption of technical measures, like pseudonymisation or
encryption by default.19 The current technical state of the art,
implementation costs, and the risks to rights and freedoms of
individuals need to be factored in. Furthermore, by default,
controllers should ensure processing is necessary and data is
not shared without individuals’ knowledge. Subjects should
be able to determine the ‘amount of personal data collected,
the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and
their accessibility’.20 However, the practical difficulties of do-
ing compliance for the distributed computational world of the
IoT strengthen the case for creating new IoT infrastructures
and business models. In this paper, we consider Personal
Information Management Systems (PIMs) as a PbD tool that
can technically support realisation of the RTDP. As an aside,
the European Data Protection Supervisor has great optimism
about the promise of PIMS as a PbD tool [32]. Instead of
services aggregating and sharing with third-party personal da-
ta for analysis, users store data and permit certain service
providers to either access their data from, or analyse data in,
their PIMS. For IoT, the case for PIMS is even greater, as they
have scope to provide users with a clear point of control over
who accesses their data (or who is permitted to run analytics
locally on that data), for what purposes, for how long, and so
forth.
A related challenge in realising the RTDP, and more broad-
ly PbD, in practice, is that by explicitly involving designers,
there is a need to support designers in their engagement with
regulatory practices. Whilst IT regulation has long recognised
the importance of design as a regulatory tool [49, 64] situating
the role of designers in practice is difficult. Currently, the lack
of awareness and practical tools for doing PbDmean it is often
ignored in traditional engineering practices [22]. Whilst PbD,
and what it requires, may be ostensibly accessible for regula-
tors and lawyers, for IT designers, it is less clearly prescriptive
[10]. Guidance on actually how to do PbD in practice is still
thin on the ground [45], hence recent explorations of how to
transform legal obligations into more accessible forms, like
ideation cards [53] or privacy patterns [17] to prompt reflec-
tion and action.
More holistically, there are many opportunities for IT de-
signers, as a new type of regulator, to engage with regulation
and do PbD in practice [85]. Domains of IT design like
privacy-enhancing technologies (PETS) [13], privacy engi-
neering [25, 75], usable privacy [40] and human data interac-
tion [56] all have methodologies and frameworks to offer.
Those orientated to the HCI tradition are particularly valuable
16 Art 12 as applies to Arts 15–22—i.e. the right of access, to erasure, of
rectification, of restriction of processing, portability, to object, or against au-
tomated decision making
17 Art 12(1); this also applies for information to be provided under Articles 13
and 14.
18 Article 13 and Article 14 (the information provision differs slightly depend-
ing if data is directly obtained from data subjects, or indirectly, by sharing from
another controller).
19 Recital 78 GDPR
20 Article 25(2) GDPR
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due to end user proximity, and awareness of reflecting user
values in design [35]. IT designers are not currently held to the
same standards of public accountability, process and transpar-
ency as state regulators, which raise questions about their le-
gitimacy to regulate, as non-state actors [82, 84]. However,
they can engage with user practices and the environment of
technology deployment through design ethnographies,
prototyping, co-design and participatory approaches [20].
Through end user proximity and feedback, they can become
legitimate in doing PbD, responding to their regulatory role in
more prospective, novel and user centric ways [82].
Importantly, whilst IT designers can regulate through mediat-
ing user interactions by design decisions and shaping user
behaviour through design, precisely how they do so is impor-
tant, and reflecting on the ethical as well as legal dimensions
of their role is critical.
3 RTDP for domestic IoT
Our drive for doing the RTDP for the IoT is motivated by three
primary concerns.
Firstly, the RTDP seeks to empower users, which this is
critical because IoT challenges the legibility of personal
data flows [78]. The ambient nature of IoT data process-
ing, the complex range of stakeholders in the IoT ecosys-
tem and the practical challenges in realising GDPR com-
pliance across these different stakeholders raise chal-
lenges; for example, even if one stakeholder is compliant,
others in the supply chain might not be.
Secondly, the RTDP offers an opportunity to make the
case for new privacy preserving business models. RTDP
is a stimulus for the IT design community to reflect on
how to do IoT privacy in a different way. How current
online platforms handle end user privacy, limiting agency
of users to control their data (e.g. by aggregating data on a
mass scale from different platforms into big datasets
stored in cloud to be algorithmically analysed for patterns
and possible value), is not the best practice blueprint for
the nascent IoT industry. By considering RTDP, we can
question why IoT businesses would continue running in
this manner, when it will lead to considerable compliance
challenges to implement the RTDP.
Thirdly, RTDP could enable users to derive utility from
their IoT devices. Instead of connecting devices to the
Internet, purely for the sake of it, RTDP is the first step
in users taking more control over their data to derive
meaning. Through fusion of data from different sources,
more accurate assessment of how they use their homes or
interact with different systems may be possible, not for
benefit of organisations, but for the user’s own goals and
needs.
Fundamentally by looking at the RTDP for the IoT, we are
questioning why systems continue to be built to collect data
for centralised analysis, perhaps there is a the need to find a
different technical and businessmodel. As an emerging sector,
IoT businesses are well placed to take advantage of new ap-
proaches, like PIMS. They can both realise RTDP compliance
obligations by providing local control and lead a new culture
around data handling. In that respect, doing PbD (specifically
around RTDP) for the domestic IoT through use of PIMS
could be a test bed as to how new PbD strategies can be
implemented to realise GDPR rights. It is critical to learn
lessons from the intersection between IoT, PbD, RTDP and
PIMs to formulate blueprints for protection of other GDPR
rights, like the right to object, erasure, or against profiling.
That being said, we need to think a bit more about why the
IoT is a complex domain for doing PbD and protecting the
RTDP. To situate this trend, it is important to remember the
IoT develops from a long lineage of technological visions like
ubicomp [92], calm [93] and pervasive computing [70], am-
bient intelligence (AmI) [1] and home automation [48].
Extensive technical research has sought to engineer these re-
spective visions, like creating seamless networking across dif-
ferent contexts or building device interfaces and infrastructure
that is ‘invisible in use’ [51]. Much research has been con-
ducted under each of these terms; hence, it is useful to learn
from stumbling blocks of these earlier technological
aspirations.
Critical reflection on the utility of engineering seamless
networking, invisibility in use and calm interfaces [66, 77]
highlights how future centric narratives often postpone ad-
dressing issues of the present, particularly user interests,
which are often marginalised [9]. Technically driven smart
home research, for example, has been led by high level prom-
ises of increased efficiency, convenience and comfort for users
as opposed to engaging with their contextual needs, practices
and routines [48, 95]. For the RTDP to become a reality, much
work is necessary on technically implementing portability, for
example increasing interoperability through data standards.
The end user is core to this shift, and any technical
implementations need to keep sight of this. Working out
how to technically implement portability is important, but
thinking about how it can be made usable and provide utility
to the end user is just as important.
With domestic IoT, the setting of the home is critical, as
smart home research has shown it is a contested social space
where relationships between occupants are shaped by differ-
ent domestic routines, practices and hierarchies (e.g. between
parents and children) [19, 65, 77]. The context of deployment
is important and implementations of RTDP need to ensure
they do not interfere with practices of the home and negatively
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impact occupants (e.g. creating tensions between parents who
want oversight of when teens enter and leave the home
through a service that tracks this, and teens who want porta-
bility in that data so their parents cannot do this) [81]. Like
smart homes, the domestic IoT is not set to come into being
overnight [31], hence RTDP also has to contend with interac-
tion between legacy systems and new data driven IoT devices
and services. Learning lessons from these earlier trends means
putting users at the centre of IoT product and service research,
development and commercialisation.
Unlike Ubicomp or AmI, IoT generally lacks a canon-
ical technical framing, although it was originally coined in
the context of tracking objects across product supply
chains [8]. Defining what is or is not the IoT is compli-
cated, and arguably unnecessary [54]. Nowadays, it is
largely typified by embedding networked sensors and ac-
tuators in diverse application areas. These include smart
grids, meters and domestic energy management, connect-
ed vehicles, transport infrastructure for intelligent mobili-
ty in smart cities, and wearable lifestyle devices to quan-
tify and feed health metrics back to users. IoT is
surrounded by hype and optimism, with predictions of
billions of networked devices in the next 10 years [16,
40] where its growth can be credited to factors like
cheaper devices, access to cloud computing, increasingly
advanced data analytics and ubiquitous connectivity [67].
We do not advance any canonical definition here, but there
is value in outlining descriptive attributes of IoT from different
stakeholders and sectors. Following analysis of IoT defini-
tions from the UK Government Office for Science [91], EU
Article 29 Working Party [6], UN International Telecoms
Union [41], Cisco [16], Internet Engineering Task Force [5]
and Cambridge Public Policy [23], we see IoT being portrayed
as:
& Socially embedded
& Remotely controllable
& Networked devices for information sharing between peo-
ple, processes and objects
& An ecosystem of stakeholders around the personal data,
e.g. third parties
& Physical objects with digital presence
& Backend computational infrastructure (e.g. cloud, data-
bases, servers)
& Device to device/backend communication without direct
human input
From this wide framing of IoT, a range of emergent regu-
latory risks for end user information privacy rights can emerge
(e.g. data sensed from variety of social contexts flowing glob-
ally to the cloud, with many third parties seeking access).
RTDP, as a mechanism to increase control over personal data,
could be a useful response to many of these concerns.
Significant user concerns and apprehension stems from ad-
equate control of personal data. In Europe is evident from a
2015 survey of 28,000 EU citizens on attitudes to personal
data protection. It shows 66% are ‘concerned about not having
complete control over the information they provide online’,
nearly 70% think prior explicit approval is necessary before
data collection and processing, and worry about data being
used for purposes different from those at collection. For IoT,
the repurposing of stored data, users’ insufficient knowledge
of data processing by physical objects, and inadequate consent
or lack of control over data sharing between such objects are
other big privacy concerns [6, 67].
Within IoT, oversight of information flows between de-
vices and services, the heterogeneity of device interfaces and
engaging with the subtleties and nuances of deployment set-
tings are big challenges. With the latter, IoT devices risk ex-
posing data and disrupting domestic social hierarchies of fam-
ilies or fostering tensions between flatmates [50]. Approaches
to empower users to control their data streams (and the impli-
cations being drawn) are important here.
As an example, consider how data from different domestic
devices can be pieced together to form occupancy models:
& Increase in CO2 levels (could be the cat though [78])
& Lighting and heating control
& Passive Infrared (PIR) sensors and door contacts (i.e. tra-
ditional sensors for burglar alarms)
& In home, or more likely access point, cameras
& Energy monitoring indicating appliance use (e.g. a kettle
is easy to detect)
& Internet traffic flows (e.g. streaming audio services)
Increasing access to such sensed data for users, through the
RTDP, could enable greater literacy around how devices use
their data, and lead to more creative, useful responses or ap-
plications. For example, if occupants are aware of security
risks around access to energy load data, perhaps they will
deliberately create white noise through remotely switching
devices on and off at random times. Or with motion detection,
perhaps the cat will not be allowed into the living room as it
moves too much and disrupts the heating schedule, leading to
steep heating bills. Or with CO2 sensors linked to light dim-
ming controls, plants can be moved between rooms more fre-
quently to change ambience and comfort through lighting.
Clearly, through IoT, detailed inferences can be drawn
about daily life and ‘analysis of usage patterns in such a con-
text is likely to reveal the inhabitants’ lifestyle details, habits
or choices or simply their presence at home’ [6].
Combinations of non-personal data from IoT can also create
sensitive personal data (which consequently need explicit user
consent under data protection law) where systems collect ‘data
on food purchases (fridge to supermarket system) of an indi-
vidual combined with the times of day they leave the house
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(house sensors to alarm system) might reveal their religion’
[23]. Providing greater awareness to end users of the stories
their IoT objects can tell about them could lead to questioning
and renegotiation of relationships between users, their data
footprint and their devices.
4 Realising the RTDP with PIMS
Having considered the nature of the right above, we now focus
on some practical issues around implementation. As we have
suggested, data portability is about more than the technical
right of data subjects to receive their data from one data con-
troller and to transmit it to another. It is about empowering
users to exercise control and choice over how their data is
handled. It seeks to create more informed users who can ob-
tain utility from accessing their data, to disrupt the established
businessmodels of platforms locking users in and importantly,
to prompt creation of alternative commercial approaches to
personal data in the market [7]. Strategies to implementation
then are keys.
Various approaches are advised to enable reuse and porta-
bility of data, like enabling data subjects to directly download
data for insertion in personal data stores or to be held by a
trusted third party. APIs have a big role to play, particularly
with complex, large datasets and direct transfer between con-
trollers [60]. Where scale or complexity of data make porta-
bility hard, controllers should provide dashboards and ensure
data subjects understand the ‘definition, schema and structure
of the personal data’ [7:18].
In terms of creating data in structured, commonly used,
interoperable and machine-readable formats, very little specif-
ic guidance is provided, beyond recommendations of using
common open formats like CSV [80], XML and JSON and
avoiding proprietary formats [7:18]. The focus should be on
ensuring interoperability, whatever that requires, as opposed
to implementing specific formats [7:17]. Nevertheless, inter-
operable and machine readable are terms defined in law. The
former is different organisations interacting to reach mutual
goals by sharing knowledge, information, business practices
and exchanging data.21 The latter is open or proprietary file
formats ‘structured so that software applications can easily
identify, recognise and extract specific data, including individ-
ual statements of fact, and their internal structure’.22 For struc-
tured data, extensive should be attached metadata to provide
context and granularity for the data being ported, and devel-
opment of interoperable standards and formats by industry [7].
Despite these high-level legal requirements, technical ap-
proaches to achieving data portability are still quite open.
After a request to exercise the legal rights, communications
about actions by the data controller should be sent to the data
subject without undue delay, normally within 1 month.23
Where necessary, due to complex or numerous requests, this
period can be extended by 2 months, but data subjects need to
be told of delays, with justifications, within the initial 1 month.
If controllers do not act on requests, they need to tell the data
subject why within a month of the request receipt, or risk
complaints with oversight authorities, like the UK ICO, and
even judicial remedies. By default, any communication about
requests for action are to be provided free of charge. For man-
ifestly unfounded, excessive or repetitive requests (to be prov-
en by the controller), a reasonable fee for administrative costs
can be requested, but equally refusal to act is an option.
Controllers can also request more information from data sub-
jects to prove their identity before sending data, an important
security measure.
As mentioned, we are interested in the role new personal
data processing architectures can play in supporting increased
user control, to enable the right to data portability, particularly
for the IoT. Accordingly, we evaluate the current technical
state of the art in PIMS. To introduce them briefly, PIMS put
users at the core of data processing by maintaining a proxi-
mate relationship with their data, either through local or cloud-
based storage. Users retain control over data sharing, oversee
who accesses their data, and have increased transparency
around purposes of data use. PIMS can challenge the domi-
nant business models of users ‘paying’ for services with their
own personal data and can enable a shift away from services
aggregating and analysing data to spot patterns, trends and
ultimately derive value from these [32:12]. Instead, with
PIMS users can permit third parties access to their data
through machine readable consent terms, exercise choice over
running personal analytics services, and maintain oversight of
their data through dashboards [32:13]. In Sect. IV, we shall
return to consider limitations of PIMS, but illustrate various
approaches to implementation here using the examples of
Mydex (and Midata), Databox, Higgins, ownCloud and
Locker Project.
4.1 Mydex
Mydex is a personal data store that is accessible only by the
user and provides them with a range of data management
functions. Mydex empowers individuals by allowing them
to be active participants in a personal data enabled economy
by giving greater control over management of their personal
data. Users are provided with tools and services that enable
them to gather, aggregate, organise, analyse and share their
personal data. Mydex allows the users to authorise services
21 Art 2 Decision 922/2009/EC
22 Recital 21 Directive 2013/37/EU
23 If the request is given electronically, the response should be electronic too,
unless otherwise requested by the data subject.
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access to specific sets of data and control the third parties with
whom this data is shared [62]. For realising the RTDP, it has
built-in measures that help moving of data into and out of the
system, from granular levels to mass transfers, spreading
across multiple formats and platforms [57]. They provides
an API that allows for attribute exchange services that include
sending data to an individual’s Mydex store, allowing secure
access to the store (with their consent), and developing appli-
cations that run across multiple devices, accessing personal
data from users. An example Mydex application is voluntary
UK midata initiative.24 Midata is a government led and has
industry backing across different sectors, e.g. energy, banking,
telecoms, and it seeks to help consumers get easier access to
their personal data. It aims to ‘give consumers access to their
transaction data in a way that is electronic, portable and safe’
[26], and requires organisations to provide mobile apps that
help consumers, to use their data more effectively, for example
spotting trends in their consumption habits [73].
4.2 Databox
The Databox is a personal networked device that allows users
to regain agency of their online presence [37] through active
control and management of their personal data.
Service providers wishing to process user data are required
to contribute an app to the Databox ‘app store’. Part of the app
is the manifest which explicitly lists data sources required and
the processing to be performed. At app install time, the user
needs to explicitly authorise the app to access this data, while
the Databox platforms enforces the subsequent access control.
All data processing is then performed by the app, which runs
locally on the box, thus eliminating the need for data to be sent
to organisational servers. All data processing and transactions
are also recorded on a transaction log by the Databox to meet
regulatory and user accountability requirements.
Thus, the Databox forms a central hub in the home for
collation of diverse data sources of varying nature; hence, it
has significant value for increasing transparency of IoT data
flows. This allows for easy portability of this data between
applications and services provided on the box by competing
service providers.
4.3 Higgins
Higgins is a cloud-based approach that provides storage and a
locus of control to the user to manage their personal data,
particularly addresses, profiles, interests, contacts, friends, af-
filiations, etc. It allows bidirectional flow of data between the
store and service providers and with the user’s friends and
other social connections. This is enabled through the sharing
and synchronisation of attribute sets between the Higgins
instance and the other party involved. The set of attributes
shared is site dependant and varies according to the demands
placed by service providers and user’s choice. Data connec-
tions between individuals are achieved through synchronisa-
tion of attribute sets between users and their respective
Higgins stores [28].
Higgins specifically mentions the capability to export data
from it to RDF files, whenever required by the user. This
capability, to an extent, allows for data portability by helping
transfer data out of the service. But this does not satisfy the
requirement of data portability completely as methods and
recommendations for transfer to another platform are not men-
tioned. Thus, the user would always have access to personal
data but might not often be able to transfer it to another service
to resume accessing the value of the extracted data.
4.4 ownCloud
ownCloud is a self-hosted file sync and share server that en-
ables data access through a Web user interface, sync clients
and webDAV [61]. It provides an open architecture, accessible
via APIs, that supports application and plugin development to
process data from the ownCloud server, based on user choice.
ownCloud also supports online social interactions by allowing
affiliate users to upload files to a local server through
password-protected public links, helping share calendar and
photos with contacts and even have video calls while deciding
how to collaborate on something. While ownCloud allows for
third-party application integration and social interactions, it
mostly supports use of simple data types like photos, status
messages, hosting files, etc. [87]. This restriction could pose
difficulties in future personal data management and portability
as applications are evolving to require diverse kinds of data
which ownCloud might not be able to support. In the IoT
context in particular, it could face limitations.
4.5 Locker Project
Locker Project gives users the ability to control their personal
data by storing them in ‘lockers’. It is client based, with its
attribute store placed on the user’s personal computer as op-
posed to on a cloud. Services can connect and synchronise
with these lockers to access and use this data [52]. Lockers
can store data such as website account information, photo-
graphs, contacts, etc. The Locker Project uses APIs that allow
services to access the data and functionality of the system to
build applications with the data. Some example API methods
include accessing a user dashboard, retrieving diary entries
and managing permissions to access data. Therefore, it sup-
ports easy data portability as users can choose what applica-
tions to share their data with and help connect to those appli-
cations by providing their data through the Locker Project.24 https://midata.mydex.org
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5 Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Technical barriers and implementation challenges
for adoption of PIMS to enable data portability
There are a range of barriers to adoption and implementation
of these platforms. Below, we consider issues around low
usability, hyperbolic discounting, user trust management, data
format inconsistencies, platform and policy differences, and
lastly, the relational and permanent nature of data. We consid-
er each of these in turn below.
5.1.1 Low usability
Data portability is still a distant concept to the average user
often because of the highly technical nature of the subject and
solutions involved. While privacy enthusiasts might be com-
fortable parsing CSVs and XMLs and running scripts for
uploading and retrieving data through API invocation, the
average user needs simple, fast and useable solutions that
make the decision of porting data conceivable and practical.
While there is extensive research that considers methods that
make data portability a fast and practical reality, there is an
explicit call to the HCI community to contribute towards mea-
sures that would make adoption of these radical new solutions
seamless and organic.
5.1.2 Overcoming hyperbolic discounting
Research shows that one of the primary reasons for the priva-
cy paradox is the low value presented by actions that ensure
privacy versus the service that awaits them on the other side
[11, 58]. This often leads to hyperbolic discounting [3] where
the users are happier skipping any extra interactions that en-
sure privacy. Research has shown that while interacting with
technologies like personal data containers there is a very high
possibility of an extension of this behaviour [44]. To ensure
active user participation with such technologies, there must be
more research that explicitly demonstrates the value of use of
such technologies and the higher symmetry of power it offers
users. This would compel them to adopt such measures into
their everyday data interactions, by default.
5.1.3 User trust management
A possible challenge that faces the use of PIMs is trust users
have in organisations. Users often decide what data to share
with whom depending on the trust and history they have with
the data controllers involved [68]. Therefore, depending upon
the context, there is the possibility of users choosing to share
personal data with organisations they trust rather than choos-
ing to manage the data themselves, despite the implications
this sharing might entail. Particularly, in the case of PIMS,
there is the possibility of the user feeling more vulnerable to
security threats by placing a big portion of their data in one
single location and hence refraining from using it.
5.1.4 Data format inconsistencies
Lack of consistency in data formats used is a barrier that con-
tributes considerably to the successful implementation of data
portability measures. When transferring data from one plat-
form to another, the retrieved data should be of a form that is
acceptable by the receiving entity. Organisational differences
in coding styles mean that this situation is not often achieved
by default. For an average user, this would pose a hindrance in
the porting process with no means to input data in the form the
receiver expects. Schema agnostic data storage solutions (e.g.
Higgins use of RDF) that provide APIs that enable storage and
retrieval could help alleviate the problem of data interopera-
bility to an extent, but the affordances they provide to the users
are yet to be studied and improved upon. Solutions like the
Personal Data Lake [90] addresses the big data 3V challenge
(variety, volume and velocity) by accepting and storing per-
sonal data regardless of format but while the back-end of these
systems might be sharpening by the minute, the user facing
side of such technologies need polishing to ensure improved
adoption into users’ everyday lives.
5.1.5 Platform differences
Closely linked to challenges associated with data interopera-
bility are platform interoperability issues. Porting data be-
tween platforms triggers numerous questions directed at the
user, which could lead to intimidation and poor decision mak-
ing. An example of this could be UI differences between the
two platforms. If the two UIs do not follow similar formats,
the transfer could be arduous and even meaningless.
Transferring data from an image-based platform to a text-
based platform could highlight several inconsistencies which
could lead to a dysfunctional result. To help mitigate such
situations, there should be solutions that guide users to choose
between compatible platforms and experiences that ease them
into the shift through guided transfers that help users make
decisions in a rational and confident manner.
5.1.6 Policy differences
Shadowing the nature of platform inconsistencies are policy
differences between the two platforms involved. Privacy pol-
icies of organisations could vary according to their needs,
goals, values, priorities and jurisdiction. Hence, the collection,
use and retention of personal data would be done in different
ways by different data consumers. What might be held private
by one platform could be displayed publicly by another and
vice versa. When making the decision to port one’s data, the
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user should be made aware of such policy differences which
could otherwise result in unexpected implications, both to the
user and the organisation involved.
5.1.7 Accounting for the relational nature of personal data
Often when discussing data ownership, there is a tendency to
relate a single user to a particular set of data. This is often not
the case as data ownership is often multidimensional. Data is
relational [18]; it is often not associated with just one person.
While a camera could be owned by a single person, a photo-
graph taken with the camera that involves a group of people is
not necessarily just one person’s data. Bringing this variable
into the equation increases the complexity of the scenario by a
considerable scale. Several questions are raised here. How is
data portability of social data managed? Does everyone in-
volved automatically become a stake holder to make decisions
in the platform shift? How will such a complex scenario be
allowed for and controlled? While currently there are no tech-
nological solutions that help answer these questions, we aim
to highlight the need for solutions that respect the multi-
dimensional nature of personal data ownership that calls for
active participation from all subjects involved.
5.1.8 Permanent nature of data
Another challenge associated with the nature of data as a re-
source, is its capability to be copied, reused and propagated
indefinitely [97]. This attribute of data means that once data is
received by a party, if their policy (accepted by the user) states
so, they could retain the data forever, despite the user having
made the decision to transfer it to a different platform. This
situation portrays the need for less server side data processing
andmanagement and increased activity on the user side so that
data consumers do not have to access or store personal data at
any time, while always providing the services they offer.
Solutions like the Databox [37] are heralding in this change
but the novelty of the approach means that there are a number
of technological challenges to be overcome. These include
possible time delays, need for more processing power on the
box, etc.
5.2 Legal and commercial dimensions of the RTDP
in the emergent IoT industry
There are numerous legal and commercial considerations
around the RTDP for the IoT. Legal scholarship frequently
focuses on the relationship of RTDP with competition law
[76, 86, 88, 98]. One concern is the RTDP applies widely, to
all data controllers, not just those in a dominant market posi-
tion [76:349]. This puts significant compliance requirements
on new SMEs/start-ups, with associated challenges for their
resources of bringing new products to market whilst also
being compliant and putting in place infrastructure for doing
data portability transfers [76, 88]. Others scholars are con-
cerned at competition law providing redress for vendor lock-
in and non-actioning of data portability requests [88]. For
example, Van der Auwermeulen [86] argues that competition
law is not the best route to guaranteeing data portability in
Europe, as traditional metrics for measuring dominant market
power in a relevant market do not always translate well to
online companies. Technical feasibility is another concern,
particularly the level of interoperability necessary for transfer
of data without hindrance [76:340, 89]. Zanfir [98] looks at
the importance of the RTDP for cloud providers maturing, as a
mechanism to increase trust in these services long term.
We take a different direction in this article, instead consid-
ering limitations of the right and challenges IoT infrastructures
can pose.We then reflect on implementation concerns, such as
the nature of user control enabled by PIMs and how to ensure
resilience to changes in the DP law framework, namely from
Brexit. Lastly, we consider IoT market willingness (or lack of)
to the RTDP and PIMS.
5.2.1 RTDP limitations
The RTDP is somewhat narrower than it first appears. One
limitation is that it does not cover inferences from personal
data analysis, like algorithmically or statistically derived
categorisations or personalisation profiles. In the context of
IoT, which functions by inferences to determine user context
and provide appropriate services, this is a shortcoming. Users
have power under RTDP to move the raw personal data that
feeds these profiles, but cannot control or move the inferences.
Concerns around profiling ordinarily stem from the lack of
transparency in assumptions being drawn and the second-
order impacts for individuals, like being denied access to ser-
vices or being subject to prejudicial treatment [21, 23]
Responses of the IoT industry could be either positive or
negative. Positively, services could find mechanisms to pro-
vide functionality without collecting personal data, mitigating
the need for users to rely on DP rights. Negatively, in that
scenario, users may still be subject to profiling and the impacts
that it creates, but as personal data is not being processed, they
cannot rely on their DP rights to exercise control through the
RTDP. New technical approaches to achieve functionality can
call into question application of relevant laws. To take the
well-worn example of cookies, Article 5(3) of the e-Privacy
Directive 2002 requires user consent for information (not just
personal data) to be stored or accessed on user devices, i.e.
with browser cookies [46]. One response has been device
fingerprinting, increasingly used to uniquely identify users
to track and profile them online as an alternative to placing
cookies on user devices [2, 38]. However, as this can be done
passively, with no information placed on the end user equip-
ment, questions can be raised as to applicability of Article
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5(3). Luckily, regulatory bodies have clarified fingerprinting
is covered by Art 5(3) and extends to the IoT context like
smart TVs, electricity meters and in car systems [6].
However, the uncertainty where technical implementation
may frustrate the intent of legal provisions has corollaries with
data portability. The RTDP seeks to empower end users and
provide them increased control, but in the context of IoT,
omission of profiles within the right could lead to adverse
effects through insufficient user control.
5.2.2 Beyond RTDP
Mentioned above, it is important to recall that the right to data
portability does not exist in isolation, and there are several
other new data subject rights in GDPR which will also pose
significant challenges for IoT designers to implement. The
Right to Erasure (better known as the Right to be Forgotten),
for example, gives users have a right to data deletion without
delay. If user consent is withdrawn or data is no longer neces-
sary, controllers must delete it. This right must be balanced
against other rights, like freedom of expression. Similarly, the
Right to Restriction allows users a right to restrict data pro-
cessing. Instead of full deletion, they may choose to restrict
use of their data. Restricted data can only be processed in
limited circumstances. Lastly, the Right to Object means users
can object to their data being processed, particularly for direct
marketing, and after they object, the direct marketer must stop
using their data. Systematic analysis of what these require for
design go beyond the scope of this paper, but compliance with
the GDPR, and doing PbD for the IoT, is far broader than just
doing data portability.
5.2.3 IoT and the household exemption
Mentioned above, in relation to third-party data, the house-
hold exemption also needs further attention. This practical
legal exemption ensures individuals are not subject to the full
remit of DP law where unnecessary, for example in keeping a
personal address book. The scope of the exemption is
contested [96], but a recent test case provided clarity for IoT
devices. In Rynes (Case C-212/13), it was found that
homeowners running domestic CCTV could not claim the
exemption when it also captures data from public spaces, such
as neighbouring gardens or a street. The homeowner is pro-
cessing personal data by recording videos, and thus subject to
all the obligations of a data controller under the law (the cur-
rent DPR). Under GDPR, this would include providing data
portability. For IoT, how then do they respond to requests
from individuals walking past on the street or neighbours hav-
ing a BBQ that happen to be caught on a smart home security
system? When designing IoT interfaces, IT designers may
need to provide tools for homeowners, as possible data
controllers, to manage their obligations to any data subjects
visiting nearby properties, or passing by on the street.
5.2.4 Establishing IoT data controllers
Linked to this is challenges in realising rights for interconnect-
ed IoT devices and services. The complexity of emerging IoT
ecosystems means establishing who is the data controller, and
responsible for data portability, is not always easy. In the home
context, again, even if a controller can be established, trans-
parency of personal data flows between different devices, plat-
forms and stakeholders is low. Furthermore, there are a range
of actors with vested interests in devices and services from
cloud storage, mobile device manufacturers, device manage-
ment apps, service providers, hardware manufacturers, third-
party marketing and even law enforcement. The lack of legi-
bility of data flows to end users complicates reliance on rights,
although this is not unique to data portability. Nevertheless,
how are data portability requests actioned and what mecha-
nisms are in place for practically passing these between data
controllers? Do users have to request from each data control-
ler, and if so, how can that process bemade practical from aUI
perspective?
5.2.5 IoT device heterogeneity
GDPR also establishes requirements of increased information
provision to users. Again, heterogeneity of IoT devices and
services mean conveying detailed, legally mandated informa-
tion in a user-legible manner is a design challenge to be over-
come. Domestic IoT device management platforms, like
Works with Nest, may have a role to play, putting in place
measures to enable requests to be passed down the chain to
different actors in an ecosystem. However, their terms of ser-
vice often limit their liability in relation to data moving to third
parties, putting onus back on users to check terms and condi-
tions of other actors [83]. The emerging nature of the IoT
market means interoperability is limited, and the motive to
create standards for cooperation is still being balanced by
the desire to become the dominant domestic IoT home plat-
form. Initiatives like Hypercat recognise the need to increase
interoperability and standardisation, and coupled with regula-
tory mandates, may foster change here [42].
5.2.6 Nature of user control in PIMS: commodity vs human
rights
If control over data can be returned to users, we need to be
careful about the types of approaches this enables.
Terminology around ownership of personal data, or data as
an asset that can be traded, needs to be addressed. ‘Data own-
ership’ suggests commoditisation and supports the narrative
that data can be bought and sold. Whilst business practice may
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suggest this is true, in the EU, information privacy rights are
inalienable human rights which cannot be lost through sale
and are given to all individuals, irrespective of wealth or in-
fluence [29, 63, 74]. In contrast, ownership models are more
popular in the USwhere limited sector specific data protection
legislation exists with data is viewed as property [94] that
subjects should be paid for use of [47]. An ownership model
sees data, and the associated values, being traded away for a
price. As human rights cannot be bought and sold, this posi-
tion is more objectionable in Europe [39] and arguably many
tensions in Europe between regulators and large US compa-
nies, stem from this ideological dichotomy in the USA and
Europe, as we have seen in recent cases like Google Spain
(Case C-131/12) or the Schrems (C-362/14) decision. As pri-
vacy and data protection law already provide mechanisms for
controlling data, like data portability, ownership models are
not necessary. Nevertheless, some EU developed PIMs (e.g.
Hub of all Things (HAT))25 continue to implement function-
ality to enable trading of personal data with third parties.
Given the privacy risks of IoT in the home, if such sensitive
data is traded, there are risks to users exposing intimate details
of their life. For example, if energy consumption data was
traded for income, it may negatively impact the financially
and socially vulnerable, especially those dealing with fuel
poverty [34]. This could create inequalities between those
who can afford privacy, and those that cannot, enabled by
architectures with best intentions of enabling more control.
Through PbD, IT designers can decide how to increase control
over personal data and reflect on how PIMS increase control
without moving to an ownership led model.
5.2.7 Resilience to legal change: Brexit and the loss
of the RTDP mandate
Uncertainty around long term mandate for RTDP in the UK
specifically, from EU GDPR, highlights the need to build
technical solutions that are resilient to legal change. Despite
the UK 2016 EU Referendum, the government has committed
to enacting GDPR [24]. Nevertheless, the GDPR, as a source
of digital human rights and its associated mandate for change,
is at risk of being disrupted post-Brexit. GDPR is an EU legal
instrument called a ‘Regulation’, meaning it directly applies
across all EU Member states, in contrast to the current DPD
which is a ‘Directive’, meaning it must be instantiated in do-
mestic law, in this instance, the UK Data Protection Act 1998
(DPA). However, post-Brexit, the UK will no longer be a EU
member state, meaning GDPR needs to be brought into do-
mestic law.26 The EU plays a critical role in setting the agenda
for digital human rights27 as it provides EU Citizens rights to
private and family life, and data protection in the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights (CFR). UK Parliamentary and Human
Rights bodies have feared non application of CFR post-Brexit
could halt future development of EU level human rights in the
UK [36, 71] and remove the formal CFR mandate for DP
rights post-Brexit [43].
The White Paper on the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ clarifies these
issues [27, 72] stating the law will:
& ‘Convert EU law as it stands at the moment of exit into
UK law before we leave the EU’. As the GDPR, will come
into force from May 2018, it will be in place at the exit
date. GDPR, like all ‘EU Regulations’, will be directly
translated into domestic law [para 2.4], so GDPR, in its
entirety, should be brought in, including RTDP.
& Give no role to Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) juris-
prudence interpreting EU laws brought into UK law. To
ensure legal certainty ‘the Bill will provide that any ques-
tion as to the meaning of EU-derived law will be deter-
mined in the UK courts by reference to the CJEU’s case
law as it exists on the day we leave the EU’. [para 2.14]
However, the role of case law after exit day is more
limited.
& Give no role to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR),
arguing as the UK will not be an EU member state any-
more, CFR would not apply. They downplay the impor-
tance of the CFR, arguing its rights just mirror those found
in other human rights instruments already, like the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or UN
Charters. However, this is not true, as CFR provides the
right to data protection (Art 8) which is not in ECHR.
The jurisprudence of GDPR interpretation through case
law, advisory opinions and policy changes from the
European Commission are all important sources for digital
rights. By leaving the EU, UK citizens’ rights are at risk. For
data portability and associated architectures for implementa-
tion, the legal drivers for changing business practices to pro-
vide greater control over personal data are at risk of falling
away. The EU has established high-level legal standards for
best practice in DP law through the GDPR. As ethical IT
professionals, these should not be ignored, but lack of legal
sanctions or oversight for non-compliance makes this a harder
case to sell, especially when balanced against commercial
costs and asymmetries in market competition (i.e. some act
ethically, others do not).
25 http://hubofallthings.com/what-is-the-hat/faq/
26 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU Art 288 – A regulation ‘shall have
general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in
all member states’.
27 Eg Article 29 Working Party advice and guidance on challenges of emerg-
ing technologies; Court of Justice of the EU jurisprudence like Schrems chal-
lenging legalities of data flows to the US or Google Spain on the Right to be
Forgotten.
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There are a number of commercial drivers that require con-
tinued UK engagement with EU DP law and privacy stan-
dards post Brexit:
& As a precondition for market access, UK needs to consider
DP law. Under GDPR Article 3(2), UK data controllers,
like companies, targeting goods or services towards EU
citizens need to comply with GDPR standards to obtain
access to the EU market.28
& The UK DP regime would need to be deemed ‘adequate’
by the EU to ensure continued EU-UK personal data
flows.29 Given the size of the UK’s global technology
sector, this is an important consideration [55]. Leading
DP law scholars have already argued the recently passed
UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016 challenges any future
proclamation of adequacy [30], and a 21 December 2016
CJEU judgement against the UK on this matter supports
this position [59]. This could see UK dealing with con-
cerns about use of non-EU cloud services, as has been the
case with use of US cloud in wake of Snowden’s revela-
tions about the NSA.
& Another alternative is negotiating a bilateral EU-US
‘Privacy-Shield’ type EU-UK agreement, but the US ex-
perience shows this will likely be a politically complex
and lengthy process.
As is clear, despite Brexit, the UKwill not be able to ignore
the GDPR. For PIMS services, and RTDP technologies in the
IoT sector, these concerns may shape business practices for
organisations with aspirations beyond the UK borders. Like
with the discussion on consent above, engaging with the com-
plexities of how law and policy interface with technology
design involves looking to broader issues, but is important
to situate our discussion within the wider context.
5.2.8 Market willingness for data portability
As discussed, strategically, data portability aims to increase
competition in the market through emergence of new services
like PIMS, different actors and ultimately to maintain growth
in the digital economy.
However, to disrupt the established data-driven business
models, we need to consider wider motivations for businesses
to change to provide users more control. User concerns over
data controls already exist, as discussed above, yet the privacy
paradox persists and users continue to pay for services with
personal data, being separated from their data at point of col-
lection, trading privacy for convenience. Post-Snowden, trust
concerns have grown in personal data infrastructures under-
pinning popular services [4], hence business models
increasing user control, instead of the default cloud based
model, could have a socially sustainable unique selling point.
However, more likely to foster change however is fear of
legal sanctions, where for GDPR non-compliance fines are
considerable, the higher of €20m or 4% of global turnover.30
However, in terms of actual enforcement, resource strapped
regulators are balancing between stifling growth in an emerg-
ing market, like IoT, and protecting users. The risks of user
harms are high in the emerging IoT market, compounded as
many IoT firms are not IT firms, but manufacturers of other
‘things’ like locks or toys. They may lack familiarity with
relevant regulatory frameworks, such as mandated good pri-
vacy and security practices, which can create vulnerabilities
from ordinarily addressable security vulnerabilities, e.g.
hashed passwords, default encryption of communications
and stored data [15].
Giving users control over their data is a big step in the right
direction. However, in the long-term sustaining shifts away
from current business models requires viable use cases where
utility and value for end users can be derived from this addi-
tional control. As with other technology trends, like open data
or smart city dashboards, applications that convey the true
value take time to develop. Establishing and responding to
actual user need, as we learned from predecessor technologies
to IoT, should be a key driver. Data portability opens many
opportunities to disrupt established digital economy business
models, and we now conclude with a few brief points.
5.3 Opportunities for the future and conclusions
There is much work to be done between the IT design and
legal community to realise RTDP and for the IoT in practice.
As we can see above, many unanswered questions (and thus
opportunities) exist around RTDP. Developing more usable
interfaces for PIMS and creating dashboards that visualise
datasets to users in a legible manner is one dimensions.
Creating new interactions and approaches for delivering com-
plex information in communications between users and con-
trollers, despite device heterogeneity, is another.
However, we would like to conclude by asking, given the
challenges the dominant personal data driven IoT business
models create, why continue with these? Why not create
new business models and architectures where data portability
is less likely to be needed in the first place. Instead of
hoovering up large volumes of personal data to later (hope
to) derive value from the data, instead sample small volumes
of the data (with sufficient detail and granularity), from legally
consenting users, to understand where the value might lie.
Instead of moving personal data to the cloud, separating
from the user, perform local analysis where it never leaves
the device, and provide third parties access to statistical
28 Art 3(2) GDPR
29 Article 25 of DPD 1995; Article 45 GDPR 30 Article 83, GDPR, 2016
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results. Changes in mindset could help data controllers avoid
challenges of implementing data portability and many of the
wider compliance challenges that GDPR, whilst finding inno-
vative approaches. Data portability has scope to address many
problems of users needing greater control, but more funda-
mentally, business models need to change so we never need
to use this right in the first place.
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